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Abstract
I examine pricing of bonds at Credit Event Auctions which are used to calculate
settlement payouts on Credit Default Swaps underwritten on issuing firms that
have triggered a credit event. Secondary market prices of bonds along with those
discovered at the auction are estimates of terminal recovery on these securities
which is conventionally referred to as ultimate recovery. I use hand-collected
data on ultimate recovery on these bonds to jointly test for bias in prices at
the auction and in secondary markets. I find that Credit Event Auctions are
biased in a manner consistent with theory and generate prices that, on average,
underestimate ultimate recovery resulting in higher payouts to buyers of credit
protection. Moreover, bond prices in secondary markets are more informed about
ultimate recovery before the auction than after it suggesting that existence of
open CDS positions enriches the information environment for these bonds.
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1 Introduction
A single name credit default swap (CDS) is a contract between two parties in
which one (protection-seller) agrees to indemnify the other (protection-buyer)
against the occurrence of a credit event pertaining to a specific entity (sovereign
or corporate) which has credit instruments (bonds and/or loans) due and out-
standing. By convention, contracts underwritten on bonds are referred to as CDS
while those underwritten on loans are called Loan CDS or LCDS. The contract
can be designed to cover a wide range of credit events such as failure to pay,
default, and various forms of restructuring.
The amount of indemnity to be paid is not explicitly defined (in most cases)
but is a function of the notional value of the contract which corresponds in char-
acter and purpose to the par value of the underlying entity’s credit securities.
Settlement of the CDS contract on occurrence of a credit event thus results in
a transfer between the protection seller and the protection buyer so as to com-
pensate the buyer for the credit event1. Since this amount (loss incurred and/or
indemnified) is unspecified when the CDS is contracted, settlement of a single
name CDS requires a mechanism to determine both the amount and composition
of the transfer between parties to the contract.
CDS are widely used by hedgers and speculators to exchange credit risk in
the economy, and, for many individual firms, the CDS market is larger and more
liquid than the market for their bonds and/or loans (Oehmke and Zawadowski
(2016)). Since the purpose of a CDS contract is to transfer credit risk, a critical
component of this market is the mechanism used for settlement of CDS contracts
on occurrence of a credit event.
Since 2006, single name CDS (and LCDS) contracts are settled (on occurrence
of a credit event) in a two stage auction conducted by Creditex and Markit. The
auction seeks to price bonds underlying the CDS contract in order to calculate
1The protection-buyer does not necessarily have a position in the bonds of the underlying
entity.
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the payout to CDS buyers (buyers of credit protection). The price of these
underlying bonds in the auction is an estimate of recovery2 and the difference
between par value and auction price is determined as the notional loss to CDS
buyers. CDS buyers are compensated for this notional loss by CDS sellers (sellers
of credit protection) in full settlement of open CDS contracts. The structure of
the auction allows for both cash3 and physical4 settlement.
The auction is conducted concurrently with the trading of bonds in secondary
markets. Secondary market prices therefore represent another estimate of recov-
ery. By convention, final recovery from impaired securities is referred to as ulti-
mate recovery. Testing for bias in bond prices from secondary markets and credit
event auctions is econometrically tedious. This is because both the auction price
and market price of bonds are estimates of ultimate recovery and bias in one can
not be inferred by benchmarking it to the other. I ameliorate this issue by using
hand-collected data on ultimate recovery from bankruptcy documents and SEC
filings. Since ultimate recovery refers to the amount recovered by holders of a
credit security on resolution of a credit event, it represents the most appropriate
benchmark for recovery estimates yielded by the auction and secondary market
prices. I seek to examine the pricing of bonds in default by jointly comparing
estimates of recovery from Credit Event Auctions and secondary market prices
against ultimate recovery.
First, I investigate Credit Event Auctions for bias by comparing recovery esti-
mates from auctions to ultimate recoveries on underlying securities. I show that,
on average, recoveries (prices) in CDS auctions are downward biased estimates of
2Recovery refers to the amount that is recovered from the impaired security in full settlement
of claims. Recovery is usually expressed as a percentage of the par amount outstanding and
called the recovery rate.
3Cash settlement implies that the CDS seller (seller of credit protection) compensates the
CDS buyer (buyer of credit protection) by making a cash payment for the loss on the underlying
securities. In percentage terms, this loss is one minus the recovery rate discovered in the two
stage auction.
4Physical settlement implies that the CDS buyer delivers impaired bonds of the underlying
firm to the CDS seller in return for their par value in cash.
11
ultimate recovery. For individual auctions, the direction of bias is correlated to
first-stage auction outcomes in a manner consistent with theoretical predictions
of Chernov, Gorbenko, and Makarov (2013) but not of Du and Zhu (2017). This
implies that when the CDS position of protection buyers (CDS buyers) is larger
than their bond position, auctions are likely to under-price recovery (leading to
higher pay-off for CDS buyers and greater loss for CDS sellers). These results
indicate that the settlement of CDS contracts is inefficient and biased.
Next, I examine the informativeness of bond prices in secondary markets
around the auction. Specifically, I benchmark bond prices (which are market
estimates of ultimate recovery) to ultimate recovery and test for bias in several
time windows before and after the auction. I find that bond prices are more
informed about ultimate recovery prior to the CDS auction but become noisier
estimates of recovery thereafter. This suggests that the existence of open CDS
positions (before the auction) enriches the information environment for bonds in
default and reduces bias in their pricing5.
Lastly, due to differential classification during the bankruptcy process, all
issues underlying an auction do not yield the same ultimate recovery. I exploit
this heterogeneity in ultimate recoveries among various issues of the same firm
for additional tests of bias in the auction and secondary market prices. I find
that auction prices are biased (albeit with reduced significance) even when they
are benchmarked against the issue with the lowest ultimate recovery among all
issues underlying an auction. This allows me to account for the cheapest to deliver
option in my analysis of bias in the auction. The cheapest to deliver option states
that, when several securities are eligible for delivery at an auction, only the issue
with the lowest ultimate recovery will be delivered under the assumption that
auction participants are sufficiently informed about ultimate recoveries on all
underlying issues. Therefore, under the condition that the cheapest to deliver
phenomenon is in force at the auction, auction prices should be benchmarked
5Appendix B contains a detailed discussion on bond prices and ultimate recovery.
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to the issue with the lowest ultimate recovery as that is the issue which is most
likely to have been transacted at the auction.
Data on ultimate recoveries for various issues of the same firm also allows me
to test if secondary market prices are informed about heterogeneity in ultimate
recovery among these issues. In line with earlier results, I find that secondary
markets seem to be more informed about the variation in ultimate recovery within
issues of the same firm before the auction than after it.
Single name CDS constitute one of the largest derivative markets in fixed
income with an outstanding gross notional value of USD 4.7 trillion and a net
notional value of USD 542 billion as at November 20176. Single name credit
default swaps are also employed in the construction of several CDS indices and
the settlement of these indices is benchmarked to auction outcomes of single
name contracts7. These indices have an outstanding gross notional of USD 6
trillion and a net notional value of USD 900 billion. Besides being large markets
in themselves, these instruments are widely used by hedgers and speculators to
trade credit risk due to higher liquidity and standardized contracts. Bias in the
settlement of single name CDS can therefore lead to economy-wide mispricing of
credit risk.
Moreover, since CDS spreads are widely used in financial research and decision
making, mispricing of recovery risk (due to settlement being biased) inherent in
these contracts can have wide-ranging practical implications. Additionally, the
arbitrage relationship between bond spreads and CDS is based on the equivalence
between loss on bonds and the pay-off from CDS on settlement, and would fail
if the settlement of CDS is inefficient. This question also has implications for
the CDS-Bond basis which is used widely as a proxy for liquidity and limits to
arbitrage8. Lastly, these results have regulatory implications for CDS as the bias
6According to Bank for International Settlements, gross-notional refers to the sum of the
par value of all CDS trades. Net-notional refers to the sum of the par values of all open CDS
contracts.
7See Markit Credit Indices- A Primer, November 2008.
8Nashikkar and Subrahmanyam (2007), Nashikkar, Subrahmanyam, and Mahanti (2011),
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in settlement seems to consistently benefit a certain type of participant in CDS
markets (net buyers of CDS).
While much research exists on other aspects of CDS markets9, a joint inves-
tigation of recovery estimates yielded by the auction and bond markets (crucial
to well functioning fixed income markets) is missing from the literature. Prior
studies examining this question benchmark auction recovery to bond prices and
provide descriptive evidence supporting mixed results. Helwege, Maurer, Sarkar,
and Wang (2009) estimate the absolute difference between auction recoveries and
bond prices just prior to the auction and find these differences to be small. They
infer from the minuteness of these differences that CDS auctions are unbiased.
By contrast, Gupta and Sundaram (2012) identify a V-shape pattern in prices of
bonds eligible for delivery in certain auctions around the auction date. They infer
auction bias from these price patterns. Chernov, Gorbenko, and Makarov (2013)
use these V-shape patterns to support their theoretical predictions of underpric-
ing in certain types of auctions. Du and Zhu (2017) predict biased outcomes from
the auction in comparison to a theoretical double auction which they find to be
efficient.
Previous studies have also been constrained by the availability of bond prices
in examining the effect of cheapest to deliver issues on auction outcomes. Specifi-
cally, Chernov, Gorbenko, and Makarov (2013) use prices of bonds trading cheap-
est prior to auction as the cheapest to deliver benchmark for auction prices. How-
ever, bonds trading cheapest prior to auction may not be the cheapest to deliver
in economic terms if the true cheapest to deliver issue is not traded, thinly traded
or mispriced by the market. Since I identify cheapest to deliver issues on the basis
of ultimate recovery, my analysis is free of estimation biases on account of market
frictions.
Bai and Collin-Dufresne (2011).
9An indicative list is Oehmke and Zawadowski (2016), Acharya and Johnson (2007), Arora,
Gandhi, and Longstaff (2012), Bolton and Oehmke (2011), Duffie (1999), Garleanu and Peder-
sen (2011), Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005), Pan and Singleton (2008), Parlour and Winton
(2013), Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005), Bai and Collin-Dufresne (2011).
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My study is also related to literature examining the ability of secondary mar-
ket prices of bonds in default to impute recovery. Specifically, Warner (1977),
Eberhart and Sweeney (1992) and Altman and Eberhart (1994) examine this
question and arrive at equivocal conclusions about the informativeness of bond
prices vis-a-vis recovery. I examine this question in the context of CDS auctions
which is new to the literature.
Moreover, Oehmke and Zawadowski (2016) also investigate linkages between
CDS and bond markets and conclude that the CDS-Bond basis trade improves
liquidity and informativeness of bond prices. While Oehmke and Zawadowski
(2016) focus on these linkages prior to default, I test for these linkages post the
occurrence of a credit event. Another stream of literature, most notably Jiang,
Li, and Wang (2012) and Wang (2011) look at the impact of factors such as
the presence of hedge funds and bankruptcy and liquidation costs on bankruptcy
outcomes and returns of various classes of bonds in default. My findings comple-
ment these studies by identifying and documenting the information contribution
of open CDS positions to the pricing of bonds in default.
The remaining study is organised in to several sections. Section two describes
the CDS auction with an example. Section three discusses the advantages of
ultimate recovery in auction prices, section four documents the data collection
process, section five discusses main findings and section six concludes.
2 The CDS Auction
The current auction format for CDS settlement was designed in response to issues
arising out of physical-settlement of Delphi CDS contracts. With notional value
of CDS contracts many times larger than bond-notional, many CDS contracts
on Delphi had to be modified to provide for cash settlement. The current two
stage auction format was first used for settling contracts on Dura in 2006 and
has become standard since.
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A CDS settlement is triggered by the occurrence of a credit event as de-
termined by a Determination Committee10. Once a credit event has been deter-
mined, a list of securities issued by the reference entity is voted upon by members
to be made eligible for delivery in the CDS auction11.
The auction is divided into two stages with outcomes of the first stage used
in the second stage. Only CDS holders (agents with open CDS positions) are
allowed to participate in the first stage of the auction while the second stage is
open to non CDS holders as well. In the first stage, dealers submit quotes for
the prices at which they are willing to both buy and sell eligible securities. They
also have to specify the quantity of these bonds/loans (par value) that they wish
to either submit or accept in physical settlement of their CDS contracts. These
quantities are called Physical Settlement Requests (PSR). Dealers are constrained
from submitting PSRs that are in a direction opposite to their CDS positions.
This means that if a dealer is a buyer of credit-protection, she can only submit a
PSR of sell, for a quantity less than equal to her long position in CDS and vice
versa.
At culmination of the first stage of bidding, bids and offers from two way
quotes that cross are eliminated and an average of the best halves of the remaining
quotes becomes the Initial Market Midpoint or IMM. Dealers with off market
quotes are penalized by an amount called the adjustment amount. The PSRs
are aggregated across all dealers and Net Open Interest (NOI) is determined. If
SELL PSRs exceed BUY PSRs then the NOI is SELL. Likewise, if BUY PSRs
10There are five Determination Committees, one for each region of the world.They were set
up as part of the changes brought about by ISDA to streamline trading and settlement of credit
derivatives. Each Determination Committee is a regional committee composed of 15 members,
10 of whom are dealers. Membership is reassessed annually. The occurrence of a credit event is
decided upon by the Determinations Committee through voting and requires a super majority
of 80 percent, failing which, it is referred for external determination.
11The list may not encompass all outstanding securities (even if they are senior) and in many
cases securities of same seniority or those subjected to lock ups in a bankruptcy are excluded.
After eligible securities, quotation amounts, and maximum bid-ask spreads have been specified
by the Determinations Committee, the auction date is determined and published.
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exceed SELL PSRs then NOI is BUY12. The first stage concludes with declaration
of the size and direction of the NOI, the IMM and the adjustment amounts.
The second stage requires participants to submit limit orders to fulfill the NOI.
This means that if the NOI is SELL, participants submit limit bid orders to buy
the bonds and vice versa. Dealer quotes from the first stage are automatically
carried forward as limit orders to buy at the bid and sell at the offer depending
on the direction of the NOI. A price cap/floor is also imposed. Usually the
cap/floor amount is set at one percent of par value. For SELL NOI, limit orders
to buy cannot be submitted at a price greater than the IMM plus the cap amount.
Similarly for BUY NOI, limit orders to sell cannot be at a price less than the IMM
minus the floor amount. Thus for a SELL NOI there is a price cap of IMM plus
the cap amount and for a BUY NOI there is price floor of IMM minus the floor
amount amount. The second stage concludes with matching of the NOI to limit
orders and the price at which the NOI is fulfilled is the final auction price at which
all contracts are settled13. This settlement price represents the recovery rate for
cash settlement of CDS contracts and the NOI allows for physical settlement.
For example, suppose a buyer of credit-protection has a CDS position of USD
100 million in notional terms and holds deliverable bonds with a par value of USD
50 million. Under a physical settlement regime she will have to purchase bonds
with a par value of USD 50 million and tender all her bonds (now aggregating to
USD 100 million in par) in return for USD 100 million in cash from her counter-
party. If the price of these bonds in the secondary markets is 50 percent of par,
her outflow will be USD 25 million (to purchase additional bonds) and her net
inflow will be USD 75 million. Assuming that bond supply is unlimited at a price
of 50 percent of par and that this price is an unbiased expectation of the recovery
12SELL PSR means that the dealer wants to physically settle her position as a buyer of credit
protection by delivering eligible bonds in return for par.
13This means that bonds that were a part of the unfulfilled PSRs from first stage are bought
or sold at the final price. CDS positions which were still open after matching of PSRs in first
stage are settled in cash at the auction price. This means that protection sellers pay protect
buyers par minus auction price to cash settle their contracts.
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on bonds, the CDS auction will also yield the same payoff.
If settlement is implemented through the current auction format, the buyer of
credit-protection can submit a SELL PSR of USD 50 million in the first stage14.
Assuming that she is the only participant with a SELL PSR and that her PSR is
fulfilled only to the extent of USD 25 million, the NOI will be USD 25 million to
SELL at the end of the first stage. This means that bonds amounting to the NOI
will be auctioned in the second stage. If the auction is efficient, it will yield a
settlement-price equal to the true recovery value of 50 percent of par and she will
be able to sell the USD 50 million (par value) of her bonds for USD 25 million.
Since she had a CDS position of USD 100 million, it will be cash settled at 50
percent of par (settlement-price) leading to a cash inflow of USD 50 million. Her
total settlement inflow in return for all her bonds will be USD 75 million in cash.
This matches her inflows under a physical-settlement regime.
Thus under the auction, CDS counter-parties have two sources of flows: physical-
settlement of bonds transacted at the settlement-price and cash-settlement of
CDS positions at the settlement-price.
3 Benchmarking Auction Recovery
Prior studies have relied on bond prices as estimates of recovery to examine
CDS auctions. However the auction is contemporaneous to trading of bonds
in secondary markets and thus bond and auction prices are jointly determined.
Ultimate recovery is the outcome of a legal process and independent of bond
trading in secondary markets thereby making it a better candidate for bench-
marking auction recovery. Helwege, Maurer, Sarkar, and Wang (2009) analyze
the absolute difference between the auction recoveries and bond prices prior to
the auction and infer from the small variance in these prices that the auction is
efficient. They assume bond prices to be a suitable benchmark for the purposes
14As a buyer of credit-protection, she can submit a SELL PSR to the extent of her CDS
position of USD 100 million.
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of examining the efficiency of auction recoveries.
Under the same assumption, Gupta and Sundaram (2012) describe and map a
V-shape pattern in the prices of bonds eligible for delivery in SELL NOI auctions
around the auction date. They interpret these patterns as descriptive evidence
in support of auction inefficiency.
Chernov, Gorbenko, and Makarov (2013) theorize that auction participants
with CDS positions larger than their bond positions have incentives to act strate-
gically during the auction which can lead to underpricing equilibria where the
auction recovery is lower than true recovery. In their model, actions by such par-
ticipants can not be nullified by their counter-parties since they are constrained
from holding/purchasing bonds that are in default. Chernov, Gorbenko, and
Makarov (2013) therefore surmise that SELL NOI auctions should lead to under-
pricing of recovery. They assume bond prices prior to the auction to be a suitable
benchmark for auction prices. They interpret the V-shape pattern in bond prices
(Gupta and Sundaram (2012)) as evidence, in support of their theory.
Du and Zhu (2017) theorize that participation constraints make CDS auctions
inefficient. Contrary to Chernov, Gorbenko, and Makarov (2013) they predict
underpricing of recovery for BUY NOI auctions and overpricing of recovery for
SELL NOI auctions. In their model, the participation constraints imposed in
the first stage of the auction and the one way market in the second stage of the
auction hinder optimal allocation and efficient price discovery. Their theoretical
benchmark for auction recovery is the outcome from a double-auction which they
consider to be efficient15. The possibility that bond and auction prices could be
determined by a joint equilibria has not yet been addressed theoretically. Also
both Chernov, Gorbenko, and Makarov (2013) and Du and Zhu (2017) assume
that the supply of deliverable bonds is unconstrained, which is unlikely.
Thus there is considerable divergence in the literature on the existence and di-
rection of bias in CDS auctions. Theoretically, Chernov, Gorbenko, and Makarov
15Appendix C contains a detailed discussion of the theory underlying CDS auctions.
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(2013) and Du and Zhu (2017) provide contradictory predictions. This is further
complicated by the fact that these studies use different benchmarks for auction
recoveries in arriving at their predictions. Descriptive evidence provided by Hel-
wege, Maurer, Sarkar, and Wang (2009) supports auction efficiency while Gupta
and Sundaram (2012) and Chernov, Gorbenko, and Makarov (2013) infer bias
from price patterns around the auction.
In order to verify if recovery estimates based on bond prices yield consistent
and unequivocal evidence on the efficiency of CDS auctions, I replicate the main
results of Helwege, Maurer, Sarkar, and Wang (2009) and Gupta and Sundaram
(2012). In line with Helwege, Maurer, Sarkar, and Wang (2009), I compare bond
prices on the day of auction to auction recovery rates using a scatter plot. Figures
1, 2 and 3 represent these plots for all auctions, SELL NOI auctions and BUY
NOI auctions respectively. A majority of the observations for all three sets of
data lie on the 45 degree line, indicating that for most auctions bond prices on
the day of the auction do not deviate significantly from auction recovery. This
implies that based on bond prices on the day of the auction, auction outcomes
seem unbiased and efficient.
I also replicate the descriptive analysis of Gupta and Sundaram (2012). I
express bond prices as a percentage of the auction recovery and plot them over
a time window spanning the auction date. While Gupta and Sundaram (2012)
and Chernov, Gorbenko, and Makarov (2013) plot these prices over a window
spanning 5 days before and after the auction, I plot bond prices over windows
spanning 10 and 15 days as well. Figures 4, 5 and 6 show the evolution of bond
prices over these time windows. Bond prices exhibit a shallow V-shape pattern
in the 5 days preceding and following the auction but do not exhibit a distinct
V-shape pattern when the time window is expanded to 10 and 15 days. This
implies that, assuming bond prices are efficient before and after the auction,
the auction is biased based on the bond prices only in the 5 day window. This
inference however, does not hold when the window is expanded to 10 and 15 days
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preceding and following the auction.
In sum, replication of previous studies yields contradictory results. Bond
prices on the day of the auction do not support auction bias. Under the assump-
tion that bond prices before and after the auction are efficient, auction bias is
supported by bond prices in the 5 days preceding and following the auction but
not by bond prices in the 10 and 15 day windows. Moreover, the assumption that
bond prices preceding and following the auction are fully informed is potentially
problematic16. Conversely, it can be argued that since the auction day is likely to
witness maximum participation in the markets by both bond and CDS holders,
bond prices on auction day (which are very similar to auction prices) are more
informative than prices before and after the auction. Under this assumption,
the V-shape pattern in bond prices could be seen as an affirmation of auction
efficiency.
Therefore, recovery estimates based on bond prices yield ambivalent results
about bias in CDS settlement and questions regarding the existence and direction
of bias in CDS auctions remain unresolved. I address this question jointly with the
question of informativeness of secondary market prices using ultimate recovery17.
4 Data
4.1 The Recovery Data
I hand collect data on ultimate recovery from several sources described in detail
later in this section. My sample contains all observations pertaining to CDS
auctions on US and Canadian entities that underwent bankruptcy/liquidation or
restructuring from 2006 to 2016.
One advantage of using this data is that ultimate recoveries can be calculated
for every security eligible for delivery at the CUSIP level. There is a considerable
16See Appendix B.
17Appendix A contains a detailed discussion on various measures of recovery.
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amount of heterogeneity in the ultimate recoveries of securities that are deliver-
able for the same auction. Given the fact that the auction yields a single estimate
of recovery, I use both an average of the recoveries across issues and the lowest
of all recoveries across issues (to account for the cheapest to deliver option) for
my analysis.
I also include LCDS auctions which have hitherto remained unexplored and
where the usage of secondary market data would be problematic on account of
poor frequency of trading and price data. Thus I have a relatively large sample
of 70 observations compared to 25 (at maximum) for all previous studies.
Data for ultimate recoveries comes from two main sources: bankruptcy docu-
ments and SEC filings. Among the bankruptcy documents, two most critical ones
are the final plan of reorganization and the accompanying disclosure statement.
The plan of reorganization provides a qualitative framework of the restructuring
envisaged and outlines the seniority of the claims. More importantly the disclo-
sure statement provides quantitative information about the pre-petition capital
structure, value of claims, mode of claim settlement and estimated recoveries on
various classes of claims. It also contains details of assumptions underlying re-
covery estimates which include the number and estimated value of distributions
to be made pursuant to emergence from bankruptcy and estimated distributable
value of the assets. Sometimes these documents are inadequate to ascertain ac-
tual quantity and value of distributions made and I refer to SEC documents filed
upon emergence to acquire this information. In some selected cases I also refer to
documents from liquidating trusts (for Lehman Brothers) to arrive at the nominal
value of distributions.
A vast majority of recoveries are in the form of equity in the reorganized firm.
While an estimate of reorganized equity value is provided in the disclosure state-
ment I do not use it because it can be significantly different from actual equity
value. Therefore I average daily prices for a month post-listing upon emergence
from bankruptcy to estimate equity value which is then used to compute recover-
22
ies. Stock price data are from CRSP. In some cases where shares are not listed on
an exchange I use OTC market data but only include price observations which are
accompanied by trading volume. Some recoveries are in the form of re-priced/new
debt/loans or reinstatements. I take these at face value. While one-time cash
distributions require no adjustments, in case of liquidations where a series of
cash distributions occur over a period of time I aggregate all the distributions
and assume that they occur on the last distribution date.
Some observations have been excluded on account of lack of data and/or clar-
ity vis a vis the implications of the credit event on ultimate recovery. These
largely pertain to restructurings or strategic bankruptcies. While I include most
US/Canadian bankruptcies from 2006 to 2016, I exclude 5 observations. Dex
One and Supermedia bankruptcies are excluded because these bankruptcies were
strategic. The two firms intended to merge for which a modification to their ex-
isting credit agreements was required. Upon being refused the said modification
by creditors, they simultaneously entered bankruptcy to facilitate the change in
the credit agreement and consummate the merger. The effect on ultimate recov-
eries and/or impairment is unclear in this case and hence these observations have
been excluded. The Cemex credit event was triggered by a restructuring that
modified the repayment schedule of liabilities. Again in this case the impact on
ultimate recoveries and/or impairment suffered by the creditors is unclear and
hence this observation has been excluded. Sinoforest and Radioshack went into
liquidation and no information is available on ultimate recoveries. The case of
Lehman Brothers is somewhat special in my sample. I could not acquire infor-
mation on securities eligible for delivery in the Lehman CDS auction (ISDA web
links are broken, ISDA did not respond to my requests for the data). Therefore
for Lehman, I use distributions made to senior unsecured bond holders of LBH
Inc to estimate ultimate recoveries for the CDS auction. In my assessment since a
majority of the senior unsecured debt in the Lehman bankruptcy was on account
of the above mentioned securities, my estimates should be fairly representative
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of the ultimate recoveries on actual securities eligible for delivery.
Lastly because there is substantial heterogeneity in the ultimate recoveries of
deliverable securities for the same auction, I aggregate them to a single ultimate
recovery estimate by taking an average of the ultimate recoveries weighted by
value of the claim outstanding on default. In order to account for the cheapest
to deliver option, I perform all empirical tests with only the lowest ultimate
recoveries as well.
4.2 Adjusting Ultimate Recoveries
The ultimate recovery rate based on the cash flows or distributions on resolution
of bankruptcy is nominal in nature because it has not been adjusted for the
passage of time and changes in state variables that impact recovery. This rate
is not directly comparable to recovery from CDS auctions that take place within
30 days of the credit event. According to Altman, Resti, and Sironi (2004)
there are two approaches to adjust nominal ultimate recoveries so as to make
them comparable to recoveries estimated near the time of default. One way is
to convert nominal recoveries to certainty equivalents and discount them by the
risk free rate. The other is to discount them with a rate that represents the risk
free rate and a premium for the recovery rate risk. I employ both approaches to
adjust nominal ultimate recoveries. For the second approach, I find a suitable
proxy for recovery rate risk and the premium associated with it.
Acharya, Bharath, and Srinivasan (2007) estimate ultimate recovery from
secondary market prices of bonds upon emergence from bankruptcy. They show
that the cumulative returns on a high yield index can be used for deflating nominal
ultimate recovery so as to make it comparable to estimates of recovery just after
default. Accordingly I use the Bloomberg Barclays North America High yield
index as one of the proxies for adjusting nominal ultimate recoveries.
I also use the Altman-Kuehne defaulted bond index and the Altman-Kuehne
defaulted loan index for adjusting CDS and LCDS ultimate recoveries respec-
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tively. These indices comprise of bonds and loans that are in default and track
their price performance. They are value weighted by the par-amount issued of
each of the instruments that comprise it. These indices are suitable for this study
since they represent the average return for the exposure to state variables that
impact recoveries, for a cross section of bonds and loans that are in default. They
also have the added advantage of allowing me to use a distinct Defaulted-Loan
index to deflate ultimate recoveries for LCDS auctions. This is important because
loans deliverable for LCDS auctions are senior-secured and the factors impacting
their ultimate recovery are likely to be different from those for unsecured bonds.
Moody’s Ultimate Recovery Database uses coupon rates on issuance to adjust
the nominal ultimate recoveries. Given the fact that there is no reason to assume
that the coupon at issuance is a good proxy for the factors that drive ultimate
recovery post-default, I avoid this approach in favor of using the Altman-Kuehne
indices and the Barclays High Yield index.
4.3 Bond Data
A part of my analysis also requires data on bond prices. I use the Enhanced
TRACE database. Bond price data is at the transaction level which necessitates
the application of certain assumptions in determining the most representative
price. The data also has duplication and redundancy which has to be corrected
in order to ensure its informativeness.
TRACE data has well documented issues on account of duplication, cancel-
lation of trades, reversal and amendment of trades and agency transactions. I
broadly follow Dick-Nielsen (2009) and Dick-Nielsen (2014) to ameliorate these
issues. I eliminate all duplicate trades by sorting on price, volume, transaction
date, transaction time and message sequence number. Next, I cull all trades and
same day cancellation reports assigned to them from the database by using the
original message sequence number variable. Lastly, I match cancelled trades with
executed trades on all parameters to eliminate reversals. Agency transactions are
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allowed to remain in the sample.
I follow Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2008) and compute volume
weighted prices for each issue for each day in my sample. These prices are aver-
aged over all eligible issues for varying time intervals depending on the test-design.
5 Results
5.1 Summary Statistics and Univariate Results
My sample consists of 70 observations (out of which one has zero NOI after the
first stage of the auction) which are divided on the basis of the type of deriva-
tive instrument for which the auction was held (CDS or LCDS) and NOI (Net
Open Interest) at the end of the first stage of the auction (BUY or SELL). For
each subsample I focus on the following variables: NOI amount; NOI amount
adjusted by the claim outstanding for deliverable securities at the time of the
credit event; Nominal or unadjusted ultimate recovery on deliverable securities
(Nominal Ultimate Recoveries); ultimate recovery that has been adjusted using
Altman-Kuehne defaulted bond or defaulted loan index as the case may be (Alt-
man Adjusted Ultimate Recovery); and ultimate recovery that has been adjusted
using the Bloomberg Barclays North America High Yield Index (High Yield Ad-
justed Ultimate Recovery). I also compute the time (in days) from the auction to
ultimate recovery and the number of issues eligible for delivery at the auction. For
each of the above variables, in each of the above sub-samples, I compute mean,
median, minimum, maximum and the standard deviation. This information is
contained in Tables 1 to 4.
Table 1 provides descriptive information on the entire sample. Mean and
median recoveries in the auction are 36.7% and 23.9% respectively which is much
lower than the mean and median nominal ultimate recoveries of 63.4% and 66.7%.
Mean and median differences between the nominal ultimate recovery and auction
recoveries are 26.6% and 22.7% respectively. On an adjusted basis the mean
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and median differences compress significantly to 9% and 6.1%, when adjusting
with the Altman-Kuehne index, and 10.6% and 7.1%, when adjusting with the
Bloomberg Barclays Index. Thus preliminary descriptive statistics suggest that,
on average, ultimate recoveries are higher than auction recoveries.
Table 2 contains summary information on the sample of auctions with non-
zero NOI, split by the direction of NOI. Of the 69 observations in the sample, 54
pertain to auctions where NOI was SELL after the first stage, while 15 pertain to
auctions where NOI was BUY. This sample split includes both CDS and LCDS
auctions. BUY NOI auctions have lower NOI amounts both on adjusted and
unadjusted basis, they have higher recoveries in the final stage of the auction.
BUY NOI auctions yield an average recovery of 52.6% and a median recovery
of 52.5% compared to 32.3% and 22.6% respectively for SELL NOI auctions.
However, BUY NOI auctions have much lower nominal ultimate recoveries with
an average of 57.5% and a median of 52.4% compared to 65% and 72% respec-
tively for SELL NOI auctions. Thus the difference between nominal ultimate
recovery and auction recovery is also much lower for BUY NOI auctions at an
average of 4.9% and median of 0.8% compared to 32.7% and 28.9% respectively
for SELL NOI auctions. Even on an adjusted basis, the difference in recoveries
for BUY NOI auctions is lower with an average of 0.3% and a median of -3.2%,
when adjusting with the Altman-Kuehne Index, compared to 11.5% and 7.0%
respectively for SELL NOI auctions. The difference between the two samples is
larger when ultimate recoveries are adjusted by the High Yield index resulting in
mean and median difference of -1.7% and -2.7% respectively for BUY NOI auc-
tions compared to 14.0% and 10.0% respectively for SELL NOI auctions. There-
fore, descriptive statistics provide preliminary evidence in support of Chernov,
Gorbenko, and Makarov (2013)’s theoretical predictions about dealer incentives
leading to equilibrium outcomes where a SELL NOI leads to auction recoveries
that are lower than true value.
The trend outlined in Table 2 is robust to further splits in the sample by
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type of derivative instrument, as can be seen in Tables 3 and 4. CDS auctions
with a BUY NOI have much lower mean and median differences in ultimate
(both adjusted and unadjusted) and auction recoveries compared to SELL NOI
auctions. Under the two adjustment measures, mean underrecovery in BUY NOI
auctions is 1.7% and 4.2% compared to 13.5% and 18.4% for SELL NOI auctions.
Median underrecovery is -5.7% and -3.5% for BUY NOI auctions compared to
9.5% and 14.8% for SELL NOI auctions. Similarly for the LCDS auctions the
mean and median differences are lower for BUY NOI auctions compared to SELL
NOI auctions.
While both measures of central tendency show that adjusted ultimate recover-
ies are lower than auction recoveries for BUY NOI auctions and higher for SELL
NOI auctions, these might be driven by a few outliers. In order to understand
the distribution of recovery variables, I plot histograms for the recovery variables
in Figures 7 to 14. As before, the sample is split by NOI. The variables are un-
adjusted ultimate recovery, difference between unadjusted ultimate recovery and
auction recovery, difference between Altman Adjusted ultimate recovery and auc-
tion recovery and lastly difference between high-yield adjusted ultimate recovery
and auction recovery.
The distribution of unadjusted recoveries for SELL NOI auctions is skewed to
the right (the mean is greater than the median) compared to BUY NOI auctions.
This relative skew is larger in the distribution of differences between unadjusted
ultimate and auction recoveries with the majority of BUY NOI observations being
less than 10% while a majority of SELL NOI observations are above 10%. A
similar trend (relative right skew for SELL NOI auctions) is visible for adjusted
ultimate recoveries.
Next I use univariate methods to test for differences between pricing outcomes
of BUY NOI and SELL NOI auctions. I calculate underrecovery for each of these
samples as the difference between adjusted ultimate recovery and auction price.
I use both the Altman Index and Barclays High Yield Index to adjust ultimate
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recovery which is estimated as the average ultimate recovery of all issues eligi-
ble for delivery. I then test for difference in means of underrecovery calculated
for the BUY NOI and SELL NOI samples using pooled, Cochran and Satterth-
waite tests. Results of these tests are outlined in Panel A of Table 5. Under the
high-yield adjustment measure, means of the two distributions are different with
95% confidence, while under the Altman-adjusted measure, the means are differ-
ent with 90% confidence. In line with descriptive results, univariate tests show
that distributions of underrecoveries of BUY NOI and SELL NOI auctions are
significantly different with underrecoveries for SELL NOI auctions being higher.
In order to account for scenarios where only issues with cheapest (lowest)
ultimate recovery are delivered at the auction, I estimate underrecovery by using
the lowest ultimate recovery among all issues eligible for delivery and run the
same tests. Results outlined in Panel B of Table 5 show that under recoveries for
SELL NOI auctions are significantly higher when the Barclays High Yield Index
is used to adjust ultimate recovery.
This implies that CDS buyers receive a greater pay-off on their cash settled
positions at the expense of CDS sellers when the first stage NOI is SELL and
vice versa when it is BUY. The next section explores these differences through
OLS regressions.
5.2 Empirical Results - Auction Bias
I primarily use cross sectional OLS regressions to test theoretical predictions
about auction outcomes. The empirical implications of Chernov, Gorbenko, and
Makarov (2013) are that both underpricing and overpricing equilibria are possible
and for underpricing equilibria to be realized the final auction price should be a
negative function of the NOI amount. I therefore test two hypotheses. The first
hypothesis relates to the relationship between NOI and under or overrecovery and
the second hypothesis relates to the relationship between degree of underpricing
in the auction and the NOI amount. For reference, using secondary market prices,
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Chernov, Gorbenko, and Makarov (2013) show descriptively that, consistent with
their theory, a SELL-NOI is positively correlated with underpricing. They also
show that final auction price is negatively correlated to the NOI amount. I test
these hypotheses independently using data on ultimate recoveries as well as bond
prices.
I first test for the relationship between NOI (Buy or Sell) and the price dis-
covered during the auction. I examine if the outcomes of the first stage lead to
underrecovery. A statistically significant association between these two variables
could imply that auction prices are systematically biased and are affected by first
stage outcomes of the auction.
I regress ultimate recoveries on a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the
first stage NOI is a Sell and 0 otherwise. Given the fact that ultimate recoveries
materialize an average of 20 months after CDS auction recoveries, I control for
the passage of time and changes in state variables through an adjustment factor.
The adjustment factor is derived from an index that proxies for passage of time
and the change in state variables that can impact ultimate recovery during the
period between the CDS auction date and ultimate recovery date. As described
in the data section, I use the defaulted bond and loan indices from the Altman
Kuehne Center and the Barclays High Yield Index for computing the adjustment
factor. The adjustment factor is the ratio of the index values on the ultimate
recovery date and the CDS auction date. I run separate regressions for each of
the two adjustment factors.
Underrecovery as a dependant variable can be measured both as a difference
and as a ratio between ultimate recovery and auction recovery. In the absence of
theoretical or empirical insights on a suitable measure for underrecovery and to
impart robustness to my results, I use both measures of recovery in several combi-
nations to test their relationship with first stage auction outcomes. Specification
5, in which underrecovery is measured as a ratio of ultimate recovery to auction
recovery and regressed on the NOI indicator and adjustment factor, is akin to
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specifications used for estimating abnormal returns. In this case, the underrecov-
ery ratio is akin to realized return while the adjustment factor is akin to market
return and the coefficient of the adjustment factor is therefore analogous to the
beta on the market. In that sense, specification 5 allows for a “market beta”
to be accounted for in the regressions and is more robust to errors emanating
from assumptions pertaining to risk premium in other specifications. First stage
auction outcomes have not been documented (either theoretically or empirically)
to be related to firm specific and/or general economic factors and this minimizes
the probability of bias and/or overestimated statistical power on account of omit-
ted variables or multicollinearity. Moreover, since all specifications involve one
measure of recovery being regressed on another measure of recovery for the same
firm, I use no other control variable except for the adjustment factor.
NominalUltimateRecovery = α + β ∗ SELLDUMMY+
θ ∗ AuctionPrice+ τ ∗ AdjustmentFactor + 
(1)
NominalUltimateRecovery − AuctionPrice = α + β ∗ SELLDUMMY+
τ ∗ AdjustmentFactor + 
(2)
NominalUltimateRecovery/AdjustmentFactor − AuctionPrice
= α + β ∗ SELLDUMMY + 
(3)
(NominalUltimateRecovery/AdjustmentFactor)/AuctionPrice
= α + β ∗ SELLDUMMY + 
(4)
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NominalUltimateRecovery/AuctionPrice
= α + β ∗ SELLDUMMY + θ ∗ AdjustmentFactor + 
(5)
Table 6 outlines the results of these regressions based on the Altman - Kuehne
adjustment factor and Table 7 contains results using the Barclays High Yield In-
dex adjustment factor. The variable of interest is SELLDUMMY. The coefficient
of SELLDUMMY which proxies for SELL NOI auctions is positively associated
with various measures of auction underrecovery for all specifications. The re-
sults hold irrespective of the adjustment factor used. For specification 5 which
allows for a market beta to be estimated in the regression, results are significant
when heteroskedasticity adjusted t statistics are estimated using White’s method.
Therefore, in auctions where the first stage outcome is SELL, the recovery rate at
which CDS contracts are settled is significantly lower than the ultimate recovery
on underlying credit securities: the auction is biased. Results from all speci-
fications, for both adjustment factors, are robust to White’s heteroskedasticity
adjusted t-statistics. These findings are consistent with Chernov, Gorbenko, and
Makarov (2013) who predict that CDS auctions misprice recoveries with auctions
having a SELL NOI leading to underrecovery in the auction. These results do
not support the analyses of Du and Zhu (2017) which predicts overrecovery for
SELL NOI auctions and underrecovery for BUY NOI auctions.
Since multiple issues of the same underlying are eligible for delivery, I also
examine the prices discovered at the auction in the context of the cheapest to
deliver phenomenon. Theory does not examine linkages between the secondary
markets and auction prices and is mute on cases where more than issue is eligible
for delivery. Thus there are no theoretical predictions about the behavior of
auction participants when multiple issues are eligible for delivery and one or
more of them is “cheaper” than others.
Under the assumption that all agents have full knowledge of the ultimate
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recovery of all eligible issues and that secondary markets are able to impute these
recoveries in traded prices with precision and supply of issues is unconstrained,
the issue delivered in the auction will be the one with cheapest ultimate recovery.
Thus under these assumptions, the issue with the lowest ultimate recovery for
each firm is the true benchmark for auction recovery.
Accordingly, I use the lowest ultimate recovery among all eligible issues and
run tests based on specifications 1 to 5. Table 8 and Table 9 outline results
of these tests. While the results are in line with those in Table 6, they are
weaker in significance. There are several reasons why weaker significance in these
“cheapest to deliver” tests does not devalue conclusions drawn from the stronger
results in Table 6. First, even under the assumption of full knowledge of ultimate
recovery, my data shows that it is fairly restrictive to assume that secondary
markets impute these recoveries with precision and that supply of these issues is
friction less. There are 11 firms with heterogeneity in ultimate recovery among
issues eligible for delivery. For 5 of these firms, the issue with the lowest ultimate
recovery does not trade cheapest in the secondary markets prior to the auction.
Thus the assumptions of price unbiasedness and frictionless trading, necessary
for the the cheapest to deliver phenomenon to be in force at the auction do not
seem to hold in my sample.
Second, it can be argued that even if the cheapest to deliver phenomenon is in
force at the auction, it weakens the incentives of some agents to manipulate the
auction for a higher payout on their CDS positions. For example, agents who are
buyers of credit protection and hold none of the underlying issues or only hold
issues other than the cheapest to deliver will earn a higher payout on their CDS
position compared to the average recovery on all the underlying bonds if only
the cheapest issue is delivered and priced correctly at the auction. Thus they
have lower incentive to manipulate the auction and weaker evidence in support
of auction bias in Tables 8 and 9 is entirely consistent with this assertion.
Next I investigate the second implication of Chernov, Gorbenko, and Makarov
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(2013), final auction price should be a decreasing function of the NOI amount.
This is critical for an empirical validation of auction bias under the Chernov,
Gorbenko, and Makarov (2013) model since this negative relationship between
auction price and the NOI amount is a necessary proxy for the holding constraint
of auction participants which leads to underpricing in the auction. Since the NOI
amount depends on the value of CDS contracts outstanding, Chernov, Gorbenko,
and Makarov (2013) recommend scaling the NOI amount by either the net no-
tional value of CDS contracts outstanding or the par value of all eligible credit
securities. Due to unavailability of historical data on notional value of CDS con-
tracts outstanding, I scale the NOI amount by outstanding par value of securities
eligible for delivery. For greater robustness I use specifications with both scaled
and unscaled NOI. Consistent with auction convention and previous literature, I
sign SELL NOI amounts positive and BUY NOI amounts negative.
In addition, I also test for a positive relationship between the extent of under-
recovery and the NOI amount. While this relationship is not predicted explicitly
by theory, it is intuitively in line with proposition 4 of Chernov, Gorbenko, and
Makarov (2013) whereby a larger NOI on account of submission of PSRs by
agents with long CDS positions can depress the final auction price, increasing
underrecovery. To impart robustness, I use several specifications to test these
relationships.
AuctionPrice = α + β ∗NOI +  (6)
(NominalUltimateRecovery/AdjustmentFactor)/AuctionPrice
= α + β ∗NOI + 
(7)
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NominalUltimateRecovery/AuctionPrice
= α + β ∗NOI + θ ∗ AdjustmentFactor + 
(8)
NominalUltimateRecovery − AuctionPrice
= α + β ∗NOI + θ ∗ AdjustmentFactor + 
(9)
(NominalUltimateRecovery/AdjustmentFactor) − AuctionPrice
= α + β ∗NOI + 
(10)
AuctionPrice = α + β ∗ AdjustedNOI +  (11)
(NominalUltimateRecovery/AdjustmentFactor)/AuctionPrice
= α + β ∗ AdjustedNOI + 
(12)
NominalUltimateRecovery/AuctionPrice
= α + β ∗ AdjustedNOI + θ ∗ AdjustmentFactor + 
(13)
NominalUltimateRecovery − AuctionPrice
= α + β ∗ AdjustedNOI + θ ∗ AdjustmentFactor + 
(14)
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(NominalUltimateRecovery/AdjustmentFactor) − AuctionPrice
= α + β ∗ AdjustedNOI + 
(15)
Specifications 6 and 7 test the second implication of Chernov, Gorbenko, and
Makarov (2013) directly and are most pertinent for the existence of auction bias.
Tables 10 and 11 show that consistent with theory, the auction price is negatively
correlated with the NOI (specification 6) and scaled NOI amounts (specification
11). This result is unexpectedly significant for specification 6 which uses unscaled
NOI, hinting at a strong relationship between the auction price and NOI amounts.
These results support the theoretical precondition for realization of underpricing
equilibria and auction bias.
In addition, specifications 7 to 10 test the relationship between various mea-
sures of underrecovery and unscaled NOI amounts. As expected there is no
significant association between the two variables. Specifications 12 to 15 test the
relationship between underrecovery and scaled NOI. Specification 13 closely re-
sembles specification 5 and is similarly more robust than others in the sense that
it allows for a market beta to be imputed in the regression. There is a significant
positive association between underrecovery and NOI for specifications 12 and 13
thereby implying that higher NOI leads to lower auction prices which increases
underrecovery and auction bias. Overall, these tests not only find evidence sup-
porting underpricing in CDS auctions but also corroborate the theoretical chan-
nels through which underpricing equilibria are realized. These results hold with
weaker significance when the cheapest to deliver phenomenon is accounted for in
Table 12.
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5.3 Empirical Results - Secondary Market Informative-
ness
I also employ a certainty equivalent based approach outlined by Altman, Resti,
and Sironi (2004) to confirm these findings. I estimate certainty equivalents of
ultimate recoveries and compare them to auction recoveries. The results are
consistent with the findings of this section18.
CDS auctions are conducted concurrent to trading of underlying bonds in sec-
ondary markets. Therefore, evidence supporting bias in CDS auctions motivates
questions about the informativeness of bond prices vis a vis their ability to im-
pute ultimate recoveries correctly. Given the endogeneity between bond trades
and the auction, bond price informativeness may also be impacted by auction
outcomes. If bond prices are informed, auction outcomes should be orthogonal
to their relationship with ultimate recovery. However, a statistically significant
association between auction outcomes and the relationship between ultimate re-
covery and bond prices may imply pricing bias in the bond market and/or price
manipulation by auction participants.
I use three approaches to address the question of bond market informativeness
in the context of CDS auctions. I use the heterogeneity in ultimate recovery of
various issues of the same firm to verify if this heterogeneity is captured by
bond prices in secondary markets. I also test if auction outcomes impact the
relationship between bond prices and ultimate recovery. Lastly, conditional on
the auction being biased, I test if recovery estimates based on bond prices are
consistent with auction bias (as ultimate recoveries are).
Eleven firms have several issues eligible for delivery at the auction and many
issues of the same firm have differing ultimate recovery values. In order to verify
the informativeness of bond markets, I test if bond prices in secondary markets
capture the heterogeneity in these ultimate recoveries which I adjust using the
18Appendix D contains a more detailed discussion.
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Altman index. I form unique bond pairs from issues of the same firm and compute
differences in their ultimate recoveries. Given the fact that bonds in default tend
to be illiquid, it is likely that small differences in ultimate recovery between bond
pairs are dwarfed by noise in secondary markets. Therefore, I exclude bond pairs
with less than USD 5 difference in ultimate recovery. I then compute the average
differences in the volume weighted prices of these bond pairs in 5 time intervals.
These are ten days preceding the auction to 5 days preceding the auction, 5 days
preceding the auction to auction day, auction day, auction day to 5 days following
the auction and 5 days following the auction to ten days following the auction.
I then regress pairwise differences in ultimate recovery on pairwise differences in
bond prices for each of these intervals. If bond prices are fully informed, they
will reflect the heterogeneity in ultimate recoveries. This means that while the
coefficient on difference in bond prices will be significant, the intercept will equal
zero as all the information about ultimate recovery is being reflected in bond
prices. A statistically significant intercept implies that bond prices are unable to
capture the heterogeneity in ultimate recoveries completely.
I outline results of these tests in Table 14. The intercept is insignificant when
pairwise differences in ultimate recoveries are regressed on average pairwise dif-
ferences in bond prices in the time intervals before the auction. However the
intercept is large and significant on auction day and for time intervals after the
auction. This seems to suggest that bond prices before the auction are more in-
formed about differences in ultimate recovery than bond prices after the auction.
These results are supported by an alternative specification in Table 15 where
I regress differences in ultimate recovery of these bond pairs on differences in
their market price and an adjustment factor based on the Altman Index. The
coefficient on differences in bond prices is positive and significant preceding the
auction implying that secondary markets are informed about heterogeneity in
ultimate recovery to some extent prior to the auction. However, the coefficient on
price differences loses significance on the day of the auction and the time windows
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following it, implying that market prices are unable to impute the differences in
ultimate recovery once the auction is over and become noisy estimates of ultimate
recovery.
Next, I directly test the relationship between ultimate recoveries and bond
prices in the context of the auction. If bond prices are informed about ultimate
recovery, auction variables (which are theoretically independent of issue specific
factors) should be orthogonal to the relationship between bond prices and ulti-
mate recovery. I test for orthogonality of two auction variables, namely, SELL
NOI and scaled NOI amount. I use volume weighted bond prices averaged over 5
different time intervals. They are ten days preceding the auction to auction date,
5 days preceding the auction to auction date, auction day, auction day to 5 days
following the auction and auction day to 10 days following the auction. I use the
following specifications:
NominalUltimateRecovery/BondPrice = α + β ∗ SELLNOIINDICATOR
+θ ∗ AdjustmentFactor + 
(16)
NominalUltimateRecovery/BondPrice = α + β ∗ SCALEDNOIAMOUNT
+θ ∗ AdjustmentFactor + 
(17)
Table 16 outlines the results of these regressions. Auction variables do not
affect the relationship between bond prices and ultimate recovery prior to the
auction. However bond prices are biased downward after the auction for SELL
NOI auctions. The underpricing of ultimate recovery by bond prices after the
auction is also significantly associated with the scaled NOI amount at the auction.
Consistent with previous evidence, these results also suggest that bond prices are
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more informed estimates of ultimate recovery before the auction.
In order to further verify the difference in the informativeness of bond prices
before and after the auction, I test for auction bias using bond prices as estimates
of recovery. Bond prices as estimates of recovery are calculated for the same five
time intervals as those in previous tests. Conditional on the knowledge that the
auction is biased (evidence from ultimate recovery), if bond prices also show the
auction to be biased in the same direction then they contain information about
ultimate recovery. If however, bond prices do not reveal auction bias, then they
are likely to be noisy or uninformed estimates of ultimate recovery. I use the
following specification to test this hypothesis:
AuctionRecovery/BondPrice = α + β ∗ SELLNOIINDICATOR +  (18)
Table 17 shows results for these tests. In line with the results from ultimate
recoveries, SELL NOI auctions under-price recovery when recovery estimates are
based on bond prices prior to the auction. However there is no evidence of bias
in the auction when bond prices after the auction are used. Given that I have
already established bias in auctions, these results suggest that, consistent with
previous analyses, bond prices before the auction are more informed estimates of
ultimate recovery than bond prices after the auction.
All three approaches used to evaluate the informativeness of the bond markets
provide strong evidence in favor of bond prices before the auction being more
informed. These results suggest that open CDS positions (before the auction)
enrich the information environment in secondary markets for bonds in default
leading to prices that are more informative of ultimate recovery.
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6 Conclusion
CDS settlement auctions were developed because of concerns of manipulation of
secondary markets by CDS traders. It is therefore incomplete to assess the effi-
ciency of these auctions by benchmarking them to secondary markets. Efficiency
of this settlement mechanism has far reaching consequences both for the pricing
of credit default swaps as well as for market integrity. Several theorists have
analyzed the auction based settlement mechanism and predicted a systematic
bias which undermines efficient discovery of the recovery rate in these auctions.
Theorists have also outlined several economic mechanisms through which bias
manifests itself in the auction price. Two major theories analyzing CDS auctions
in the literature have contrasting predictions about the direction of the bias. Most
empirical studies have used secondary market data to descriptively examine the
efficiency of the auction mechanism. A key challenge in analyzing these auctions
empirically lies in establishing a reliable benchmark for auction recoveries.
I establish this benchmark by using hand-collected data on ultimate recov-
eries from bankruptcy and SEC filings. I provide evidence to support bias and
inefficiency in CDS auctions. Empirical tests suggest, on average, CDS auctions
lead to underpricing of recoveries. This underpricing is correlated to first stage
outcomes of the auction. I provide evidence in support of the hypothesis that
under recoveries are more severe in cases where the first stage auction NOI is
SELL and are increasing in the NOI amount. Further tests reveal a negative
relationship between auction-prices and NOI amounts. Therefore, I find empiri-
cal evidence in support of Chernov, Gorbenko, and Makarov (2013) which states
that underpricing equilibria can arise with a SELL NOI so long as underpricing is
increasing in the NOI amount and auction-price is decreasing in the NOI amount.
These results do not support the predictions of Du and Zhu (2017) which envis-
age underpricing in BUY NOI auctions and vice-versa. These results are robust
to several empirical specifications and an alternate certainty equivalent based
approach.
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I also investigate the informativeness of bond prices vis-a-vis ultimate recovery
in the context of CDS auctions. I use three approaches to test for bond price
efficiency and results from all three sets of tests suggest that bond prices before
the auction are more informed about ultimate recovery and become noisier after
the auction. This suggests that the existence of open CDS positions enriches the
information environment for bonds and reduces bias in their pricing.
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Table 5: Difference in Underrecovery at SELL NOI and BUY NOI Auctions.
Differences in the means of auction underrecovery between SELL-NOI and BUY-NOI auction
samples. Underrecovery is calculated as the difference between adjusted ultimate recovery
and auction price. Ultimate recovery is adjusted using the Altman-Kuehne Index and the
Bloomberg Barclays High Yield Index. In Panel A, ultimate recovery is estimated as the
average ultimate recovery of all issues eligible for delivery. In Panel B, ultimate recovery is
estimated as the cheapest ultimate recovery among all eligible issues. Tests are run using the
pooled, Satterthwaite and Cochran methods. Satterthwaite and Cochran tests assume that
the variances of the two samples are not equal.
Panel A:
Method Altman Adjusted HY Index Adjusted
Pooled 1.83* 2.33**
Satterthwaite 1.74* 2.27**
Cochran 1.74* 2.27**
Panel B:
Method Altman Adjusted HY Index Adjusted
Pooled 1.29 1.81*
Satterthwaite 1.28 1.82*
Cochran 1.28 1.82*
*,**,*** represent significance at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence respectively.
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Table 6: OLS Regressions for Auction Underrecovery - Altman-Kuehne Index
OLS regressions based on equations 1 -5:
NominalUltimateRecovery = α+ β ∗ SELLDUMMY+
θ ∗AuctionPrice+ τ ∗AdjustmentFactor +  (1)
NominalUltimateRecovery −AuctionPrice = α+ β ∗ SELLDUMMY+
τ ∗AdjustmentFactor +  (2)
NominalUltimateRecovery/AdjustmentFactor −AuctionPrice
= α+ β ∗ SELLDUMMY +  (3)
(NominalUltimateRecovery/AdjustmentFactor)/AuctionPrice
= α+ β ∗ SELLDUMMY +  (4)
NominalUltimateRecovery/AuctionPrice
= α+ β ∗ SELLDUMMY + θ ∗AdjustmentFactor +  (5)
T-statistics are in parentheses. Square brackets contain White’s heteroskedasticity adjusted
t-statistics. The regressand is auction underrecovery. The regressors are: A binary variable
which takes the value of one if the auction has a SELL NOI and 0 otherwise, price discovered
in the auction, an adjustment factor based on the Altman-Kuehne Defaulted Bonds and Loan
Index.
1 2 3 4 5
Intercept
-0.23
(1.44)
[1.38]
-0.24
(2.20)**
[2.40]**
-0.00
(.01)
[.01]
1.01
(2.20)**
[5.30]***
-3.13
(2.46)**
[2.71]***
Sell Dummy
0.20
(2.36)**
[2.23]**
0.21
(2.45)**
[2.27]**
0.11
(1.79)*
[1.78]*
1.05
(2.00)**
[3.10]***
1.34
(1.40)
[2.18]**
Auction Price
0.98
(7.20)***
[8.06]***
Adjustment factor
0.23
(2.97)***
[2.77]***
0.23
(3.42)***
[3.33]***
3.39
(4.41)***
[3.76]***
Adjusted R Squared 0.42 0.24 0.03 0.04 0.25
Observations 70 70 70 70 70
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Table 7: OLS Regressions for Auction Underrecovery - Bloomberg Barclays High
Yield Index
OLS regressions based on equations 1 -5:
NominalUltimateRecovery = α+ β ∗ SELLDUMMY+
θ ∗AuctionPrice+ τ ∗AdjustmentFactor +  (1)
NominalUltimateRecovery −AuctionPrice = α+ β ∗ SELLDUMMY+
τ ∗AdjustmentFactor +  (2)
NominalUltimateRecovery/AdjustmentFactor −AuctionPrice
= α+ β ∗ SELLDUMMY +  (3)
(NominalUltimateRecovery/AdjustmentFactor)/AuctionPrice
= α+ β ∗ SELLDUMMY +  (4)
NominalUltimateRecovery/AuctionPrice
= α+ β ∗ SELLDUMMY + θ ∗AdjustmentFactor +  (5)
T-statistics are in parentheses. Square brackets contain White’s heteroskedasticity adjusted
t-statistics. The regressand is auction underrecovery. The regressors are: A binary variable
which takes the value of one if the auction has a SELL NOI and 0 otherwise, price discovered
in the auction, an adjustment factor based on the Bloomberg Barclays High Yield Bond Index.
1 2 3 4 5
Intercept
-0.20
(1.17)
[1.30]
-0.29
(2.08)**
[2.51]**
-0.02
(.34)
[.33]
1.02
(1.80)*
[4.47]***
-3.58
(2.17)**
[2.00]**
Sell Dummy
0.21
(2.27)**
[2.25]**
0.22
(2.54)**
[2.49]**
0.16
(2.36)**
[2.36]**
1.32
(2.06)**
[3.31]***
1.56
(1.52)
[2.75]***
Auction Price
0.89
(6.83)***
[8.43]***
Adjustment factor
0.25
(2.47)**
[2.99]***
0.27
(2.83)***
[3.51]***
3.90
(3.44)***
[2.69]***
Adjusted R Squared 0.39 0.20 0.05 0.04 0.18
Observations 70 70 70 70 70
*, ** and *** represent significance at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence respectively.
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Table 8: Auction Underrecovery using Cheapest to Deliver Issues - Altman-
Kuehne Index
OLS regressions based on equations 1 -5 using lowest ultimate recovery among all issues eligible
for delivery at each auction:
NominalUltimateRecovery = α+ β ∗ SELLDUMMY+
θ ∗AuctionPrice+ τ ∗AdjustmentFactor +  (1)
NominalUltimateRecovery −AuctionPrice = α+ β ∗ SELLDUMMY+
τ ∗AdjustmentFactor +  (2)
NominalUltimateRecovery/AdjustmentFactor −AuctionPrice
= α+ β ∗ SELLDUMMY +  (3)
(NominalUltimateRecovery/AdjustmentFactor)/AuctionPrice
= α+ β ∗ SELLDUMMY +  (4)
NominalUltimateRecovery/AuctionPrice
= α+ β ∗ SELLDUMMY + θ ∗AdjustmentFactor +  (5)
T-statistics are in parentheses. Square brackets contain White’s heteroskedasticity adjusted
t-statistics. The regressand is auction underrecovery. The regressors are: A binary variable
which takes the value of one if the auction has a SELL NOI and 0 otherwise, price discovered
in the auction, an adjustment factor based on the Altman-Kuehne Defaulted Bonds and Loan
Index.
1 2 3 4 5
Intercept
-0.22
(1.25)
[1.32]
-.24
(1.93)*
[2.15]**
0.00
(0.09)
[0.01]
.96
(2.29)**
[4.43]***
-2.33
(2.01)**
[2.06]**
SELLDUMMY
.17
(1.82)*
[1.76]*
.17
(1.90)*
[1.83]*
.08
(1.29)
[1.32]
.80
(1.70)*
[2.49]**
1.12
(1.29)
[1.95]*
Auction Price
0.98
(6.58)***
[7.84]***
Adjustment factor
.21
(2.48)***
[2.55]***
.21
(2.88)***
[2.90]***
2.67
(3.88)***
[3.07]***
Adjusted R Squared 0.37 0.16 0.00 0.02 0.21
Observations 70 70 70 70 70
50
Table 9: Auction Underrecovery using Cheapest to Deliver Issues - Bloomberg
Barclays High Yield Index
OLS regressions based on equations 1 -5 using lowest ultimate recovery among all issues eligible
for delivery at each auction:
NominalUltimateRecovery = α+ β ∗ SELLDUMMY+
θ ∗AuctionPrice+ τ ∗AdjustmentFactor +  (1)
NominalUltimateRecovery −AuctionPrice = α+ β ∗ SELLDUMMY+
τ ∗AdjustmentFactor +  (2)
NominalUltimateRecovery/AdjustmentFactor −AuctionPrice
= α+ β ∗ SELLDUMMY +  (3)
(NominalUltimateRecovery/AdjustmentFactor)/AuctionPrice
= α+ β ∗ SELLDUMMY +  (4)
NominalUltimateRecovery/AuctionPrice
= α+ β ∗ SELLDUMMY + θ ∗AdjustmentFactor +  (5)
T-statistics are in parentheses. Square brackets contain White’s heteroskedasticity adjusted
t-statistics. The regressand is auction underrecovery. The regressors are: A binary variable
which takes the value of one if the auction has a SELL NOI and 0 otherwise, price discovered
in the auction, an adjustment factor based on the Bloomberg Barclays High Yield Bond Index.
1 2 3 4 5
Intercept
-0.17
(.91)
[1.07]
-.26
(1.71)*
[2.01]**
-.02
(.42)
[.44]
.97
(2.13)**
[4.10]***
-3.22
(2.28)**
[1.78]*
SELLDUMMY
.17
(1.74)*
[1.77]*
.18
(1.98)*
[2.03]**
.13
(1.81)*
[1.88]*
1.03
(1.94)*
[2.84]***
1.16
(1.32)
[2.35]**
Auction Price
0.89
(6.33)***
[7.99]***
Adjustment factor
.21
(1.98)*
[2.37]**
.24
(2.29)**
[2.66]***
3.54
(3.65)***
[2.42]**
Adjusted R Squared 0.35 0.12 0.03 0.04 0.19
Observations 70 70 70 70 70
*, ** and *** represent significance at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence respectively.
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Table 10: OLS Regressions of Auction Underrecovery on NOI amount
OLS regressions based on equations 6 -10:
AuctionPrice = α+ β ∗NOI +  (6)
(NominalUltimateRecovery/AdjustmentFactor)/AuctionPrice
= α+ β ∗NOI +  (7)
NominalUltimateRecovery/AuctionPrice
= α+ β ∗NOI + θ ∗AdjustmentFactor +  (8)
NominalUltimateRecovery −AuctionPrice
= α+ β ∗NOI + θ ∗AdjustmentFactor +  (9)
(NominalUltimateRecovery/AdjustmentFactor) −AuctionPrice
= α+ β ∗NOI +  (10)
T-statistics are in parentheses. Square brackets contain White’s heteroskedasticity adjusted
t-statistics. The regressand is auction underrecovery. The regressors are - NOI amount in the
auction and an adjustment factor based on the Altman-Kuehne Defaulted Bonds and Loan
index.
6 7 8 9 10
Intercept
38.43
(10.20)***
[10.36]***
1.75
(7.34)***
[8.29]***
-2.48
(2.03)**
[2.19]**
-.14
(1.34)
[1.38]
-.90
(3.14)***
[3.17]***
NOI Amount
-.01
(1.45)
[2.76]***
0.00
(1.05)
[1.34]
0.00
(.73)
[1.01]
.00
(.23)
[.68]
.00
(0.25)
[0.91]
Adjustment factor
3.58
(4.66)***
[4.01]***
.27
(3.92)***
[4.05]***
Adjusted R Squared 0.01 0.00 0.24 0.16 0
Observations 70 70 70 70 70
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Table 11: OLS Regressions of Auction Underrecovery on Scaled NOI amount
OLS regressions based on equations 11-15:
AuctionPrice = α+ β ∗AdjustedNOI +  (11)
(NominalUltimateRecovery/AdjustmentFactor)/AuctionPrice
= α+ β ∗AdjustedNOI +  (12)
NominalUltimateRecovery/AuctionPrice
= α+ β ∗AdjustedNOI + θ ∗AdjustmentFactor +  (13)
NominalUltimateRecovery −AuctionPrice
= α+ β ∗AdjustedNOI + θ ∗AdjustmentFactor +  (14)
(NominalUltimateRecovery/AdjustmentFactor) −AuctionPrice
= α+ β ∗AdjustedNOI +  (15)
T-statistics are in parentheses. Square brackets contain White’s heteroskedasticity adjusted
t-statistics. The regressand is auction underrecovery. The regressors are - NOI scaled by
claims outstanding and an adjustment factor based on the Altman-Kuehne Defaulted Bonds
and Loan Index.
11 12 13 14 15
Intercept
41.82
(10.75)***
[10.29]***
1.42
(6.04)***
[7.32]***
-2.27
(2.02)**
[2.19]**
-.1426
(1.28)
[1.33]
-.0746
(2.44)**
[2.31]***
Adj NOI Amount
-78.74
(3.13)***
[5.31]***
5.38
(3.67)***
[2]**
9.51
(3.61)***
[1.79]*
.283
(1.09)
[1.02]
.236
(1.25)
[1.29]
Adjustment factor
3.04
(4.22)***
[4.15]***
.2543
(3.59)***
[3.7]***
Adjusted R Squared 0.1 0.15 0.36 0.17 0.00
Observations 70 70 70 70 70
*, ** and *** represent significance at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence respectively.
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Table 12: OLS Regressions of Auction Underrecovery using Cheapest to Deliver
Issues on NOI amount
OLS regressions based on equations 7 -10:
(NominalUltimateRecovery/AdjustmentFactor)/AuctionPrice
= α+ β ∗NOI +  (7)
NominalUltimateRecovery/AuctionPrice
= α+ β ∗NOI + θ ∗AdjustmentFactor +  (8)
NominalUltimateRecovery −AuctionPrice
= α+ β ∗NOI + θ ∗AdjustmentFactor +  (9)
(NominalUltimateRecovery/AdjustmentFactor) −AuctionPrice
= α+ β ∗NOI +  (10)
T-statistics are in parentheses. Square brackets contain White’s heteroskedasticity adjusted
t-statistics. The regressand is auction underrecovery. The regressors are - NOI amount in the
auction and an adjustment factor based on the Altman-Kuehne Defaulted Bonds and Loan
index.
7 8 9 10
Intercept
1.52
(7.46)***
[8.53]***
-1.72
(1.60)
[1.60]
-15.13
(1.27)
[1.33]
6.26
(2.98)**
[2.17]**
NOI Amount
0.00
(1.40)
[1.48]
0.00
(1.24)
[1.27]
.00
(0.02)
[0.04]
0.00
(0.17)
[0.36]
Adjustment factor
2.77
(4.11)***
[3.34]***
24.56
(3.30)***
[3.43]***
Adjusted R Squared 0.01 0.20 0.11 0
Observations 70 70 70 70
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Table 13: OLS Regressions of Auction Underrecovery using Cheapest to Deliver
Issues on Scaled NOI amount
OLS regressions based on equations 12-15:
(NominalUltimateRecovery/AdjustmentFactor)/AuctionPrice
= α+ β ∗AdjustedNOI +  (12)
NominalUltimateRecovery/AuctionPrice
= α+ β ∗AdjustedNOI + θ ∗AdjustmentFactor +  (13)
NominalUltimateRecovery −AuctionPrice
= α+ β ∗AdjustedNOI + θ ∗AdjustmentFactor +  (14)
(NominalUltimateRecovery/AdjustmentFactor) −AuctionPrice
= α+ β ∗AdjustedNOI +  (15)
T-statistics are in parentheses. Square brackets contain White’s heteroskedasticity adjusted
t-statistics. The regressand is auction underrecovery. The regressors are - NOI scaled by
claims outstanding and an adjustment factor based on the Altman-Kuehne Defaulted Bonds
and Loan Index.
12 13 14 15
Intercept
1.21
(5.99)***
[6.7]***
0.72
(1.31)
[1.26]
-14.26
(1.21)
[1.28]
4.27
(1.33)
[1.26]
Adj NOI Amount
5.16
(4.11)***
[1.92]*
4.87
(3.76)***
[1.82]*
37.07
(1.35)
[1.32]
28.32
(1.42)
[1.53]
Adjustment factor
0.33
(0.94)
[0.94]
22.16
(2.95)***
[3.14]***
Adjusted R Squared 0.19 0.19 0.14 0.1
Observations 70 70 70 70
*, ** and *** represent significance at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence respectively.
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Table 14: OLS Regression of pairwise differences in ultimate recovery on pairwise
differences in bond prices.
Regressions of pairwise differences in the ultimate recoveries of various issues of the same
underlying firm on pairwise differences in the prices of those issues in secondary markets.
Ultimate recoveries are adjusted using the Altman-Kuehne Index. Pairwise differences in bond
prices are estimated as difference in volume weighted prices of issues of the same underlying
firm. The tests are run for bond price samples from five different time windows around the
auction date. Each column contains results for the test run for the time window specified in
the column heading.
Variable
10 days
prior to
5 days
prior to
auction
5 days
prior, to
auction
date
Auction
Day
Auction
date
to 5
days after
5 days
after auction
to 10
days after
Intercept
-.14
(.06)
1.04
(.54)
4.67
(2.71)***
5.6
(2.4)***
3.43
(1.68)*
Price Difference
1.86
(6.2)***
1.71
(8.8)***
.81
(2.7)***
1.24
(3.45)***
1.43
(3.61)***
Adjusted R Squared 0.64 0.78 0.28 0.13 0.23
Observations 72 67 53 85 85
*, ** and *** represent significance at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence respectively.
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Table 15: OLS Regression of pairwise differences in ultimate recovery on pairwise
differences in bond prices.
Differences in the ultimate recoveries of various issues of the same underlying firm are regressed
on pairwise differences in the prices of those issues in secondary markets and an adjustment
factor based on the Altman-Kuehne Index. Pairwise differences in bond prices are estimated
as difference in volume weighted prices of issues of the same underlying firm. The tests are
run for bond price samples from five different time windows around the auction date. Each
column contains results for the test run for the time window specified in the column heading.
Variable
10 days
prior to
5 days
prior to
auction
5 days
prior, to
auction
date
Auction
Day
Auction
date
to 5
days after
5 days
after auction
to 10
days after
Intercept
-20.43
(0.85)
-52.4
(4.39)***
75.56
(7.21)***
23.44
(1.32)
50.96
(2.60)**
Price Difference
2.29
(3.15)***
3.74
(6.98)***
-0.52
(1.34)
1.06
(1.34)
-0.28
(0.61)
Adjustment Factor
13.77
(0.83)
25.28
(5.29)***
-36.54
(7.01)***
-7.77
(0.78)
-19.54
(1.86)*
Adjusted R Squared 0.15 0.71 0.46 0.30 0.14
Observations 72 67 53 85 85
*, ** and *** represent significance at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence respectively.
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Table 16: Ultimate recovery and Bond Prices.
Regressions of ultimate recoveries on bond prices and auction outcomes.The regressand is the
ratio of ultimate recovery and volume weighted bond prices of all bonds eligible for delivery at
each auction. The regressors are- A binary variable which takes the value of one if the auction
has a SELL NOI and 0 otherwise (Panel A), the NOI scaled by claims outstanding (Panel
B) and an adjustment factor based on the Altman Defaulted bonds and loan index. Panel A
shows results for specification 16 and panel B shows results for specification 17. Bond prices
are estimated as volume weighted prices for five different time windows. Each column contains
results for the subsample pertaining to the time window specified in the column heading.
Panel A: Specification 16
Variable
10 days
prior, to
Auction
day
5 days
prior, to
auction
date
Auction
Day
Auction
date
to 5
days after
Auction
day
to 10
days after
Intercept
-0.8
(.93)
-0.7
(.8)
-1.3
(1.44)
-1.4
(1.57)
-1.1
(1.26)
SELL NOI Indicator
0.7
(1.03)
0.8
(1.03)
1.29
(1.74)*
1.27
(1.72)*
1.13
(1.7)*
Adjustment Factor
1.5
(4.11)***
1.4
(3.68)***
1..81
(3.86)***
1.86
(4.25)***
1.67
(4.11)***
Adjusted R Squared 0.24 0.19 0.24 0.27 0.24
Observations 42 41 42 42 42
Panel B: Specification 17
Variable
10 days
prior, to
Auction
day
5 days
prior, to
auction
date
Auction
Day
Auction
date
to 5
days after
Auction
day
to 10
days after
Intercept
-.4
(.65)
-.02
(.4)
-.63
(.89)
-.69
(1.03)
-.5
(.77)
Scaled NOI Amount
2.5
(1.18)
2.1
(1.1)
4.7
(1.71)*
4.3
(1.77)*
4.1
(1.79)*
Adjustment Factor
1.43
(4.16)***
1.4
(3.53)***
1.7
(3.82)***
1.77
(4.19)***
1.58
(3.91)***
Adjusted R Squared 0.29 0.22 0.32 0.34 0.31
Observations 42 41 42 42 42
*, ** and *** represent significance at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence respectively.
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Table 17: Bond Prices and Auction Recovery.
Regressions of the ratio of auction price to bond prices on an indicator variable which takes
the value of 1 if the auction NOI is SELL and 0 otherwise. Bond prices are estimated as
volume weighted prices for five different time windows. Each column contains results for the
subsample pertaining to the time window specified in the column heading.
Variable
10 days
prior, to
Auction
day
5 days
prior, to
auction
date
Auction
Day
Auction
date
to 5
days after
Auction
day
to 10
days after
Intercept
.99
(8.55)***
1.01
(8.56)***
.95
(10.9)***
.96
(10.6)***
.95
(9.51)*
SELL NOI Indicator
-0.27
(2.21)**
-0.28
(2.29)**
-.08
(0.9)
-.0
(0.96)
-.13
(1.26)
Adjusted R Squared 0.11 0.12 0.001 0.009 0.03
Observations 42 41 42 42 42
*, ** and *** represent significance at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence respectively.
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Appendices
A Measuring Recovery
The concept of recovery on credit securities that suffer from a credit event has
at least two interpretations in the literature. These interpretations are based
on the method used and the time at which recoveries are calculated. ultimate
recovery (UR) requires usage of cash or cash value of securities at resolution of
the credit event to calculate the recovery rate. Recovery-at-default (RaD) on the
other hand uses prices of traded credit securities over a given interval of time in
the post-default period to estimate recovery on those securities.
Models of credit risk measure RaD in three ways. These are Recovery-at-
Face-Value (RFV), Recovery-at-Market-Value (RMV) and Recovery-of-Treasury
(RT).
RFV assumes that the recovery amount bond holders receive (or the loss that
they suffer) is best represented as a percentage of the par value of the bond on
the default date. Thus under RFV if bond prices are a perfect estimate of the
amount that bond holders will recover, a bond’s recovery rate should be it’s price
divided by par value. This implies that issue-specific factors such as the time-
to-maturity at the time of default, coupon and accrued interest at the time of
default do not influence the recovery rate measure. An empirical implication of
RFV is that prices of all issues of the same seniority should converge after default
as issue-specific factors cease to matter.
RMV measures recovery as a percentage of the market price of the bond just
prior to default. RT measures recovery as a fraction of the price of a risk-free
treasury of the same coupon and maturity as the issue in default. Thus both
RMV and RT allow issue specific factors such as time to maturity and coupon to
influence the recovery-rate computation.
Guha (2003) relates these measures to the secondary market using a sample
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of 42 firms in default. He sources bond price data from Tradeline and these bonds
range from zero to 27 years in maturity, across issues, at the time of default. He
finds that after default or bankruptcy, bonds belonging to different issues of the
same issuer trade within USD 2 of each other regardless of their issue-specific
features. Given the small range of price differential between diverse issues post-
default, he infers that bond markets measure recovery (or loss) as a percentage
of the face value of the bond thereby validating the RFV method to measure
recovery at default.
The measure used for RaD is critical to any analysis using bond prices to
examine the efficiency of CDS auctions. This is because CDS auction prices are
expressed as a percentage of the par amount outstanding at the date of default
and all recoveries should be converted to RFV in order to make a comparison
feasible. If RFV does not hold and there are issue-specific differences in bond
prices, a recovery-rate measure based on average prices of bonds across issues
may be biased for purposes of comparison with auction recovery.
Moreover, if a particular issue consistently trades below other eligible issues,
a buyer of credit-protection can maximize her payout by opting for physical-
settlement and delivering this issue. From her perspective, this issue would be
cheapest to deliver (CTD). It is likely that most bonds delivered for settlement
in the auction are CTD and thus auction-prices are most comparable to prices
of CTD issues. Furthermore, “cheapness” of CTD issues may be related to the
expected ultimate recoveries on them. Thus, the validity of RFV has an im-
portant bearing on the existence of a CTD issue and establishing a comparable
benchmark for auction recoveries.
Following Guha (2003), I examine the implication of RFV for bankrupt firms
in my sample using transaction level price and volume data from the Enhanced
Trace database. Transaction level data allows me to perform the analysis with
greater granularity. The sample period for each firm is 30 days after the filing of
bankruptcy. I first extract high prices across issues for every firm for each day in
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the sample. I then compare the highest high price with the lowest high price for
a firm, each day, across issues of the same seniority.
The difference between the two is plotted as a histogram in Figure 15. A
Majority of observations lie outside the USD 2 range established by Guha (2003).
The mean difference is USD 13.43 and significantly different from zero with 99
percent confidence. The median difference is USD 3.
Figure 16 is the histogram of the difference between the highest low price and
the lowest low price across issues of the same firm for each day. Similar to Figure
9, a majority of observations lie outside the USD 2 range. The mean difference is
USD 9.68 and significantly different from zero with 99 percent confidence. The
median difference is USD 2.825.
Figure 17 is the histogram of the difference between the highest and lowest
volume weighted prices across issues of the same firm for each day. Again, a
majority of observations lie outside the USD 2 range. The mean difference is
USD 10.57 and significantly different from zero with 99 percent confidence. The
median difference is USD 2.5.
Given shallow trading in bond markets, the above results could be due to
timing differences between trades in different issues. To minimize the impact of
timing differences on these comparisons, I divide the trades in to non overlapping
hourly intervals for each day. I then compute the volume weighted average price
for each issue, for each firm, for each hourly interval, for each day. Figure 18 is
the histogram of the difference between the highest and lowest volume weighted
prices across issues, for each firm, for each day, for each hour. A large number
of observations lie outside the USD 2 range. The mean difference is USD 7.82
and significantly different from zero with 99 percent confidence. The median
difference is USD 1.85.
Thus, empirical implications of RFV don’t hold in this sample and issue-
specific differences are observed in prices of bonds of the same seniority after
default. Persistent issue-specific differences can lead to a cheapest-to-deliver issue
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for the CDS auction.
B Ultimate Recovery and Recovery at Default
Previous studies use bond price based measures to examine CDS auctions while
I use both ultimate recovery and secondary market data. In addition to issues
associated with RFV and the difficulty in identifying the CTD issue ex-ante,
several other factors contribute to the approach using UR.
Acharya, Bharath, and Srinivasan (2007) and Jankowitsch, Nagler, and Sub-
rahmanyam (2014) argue in favor of using RaD on grounds that most holders
of bonds are forced to liquidate their holdings on occurrence of a credit event
due to institutional compulsions and therefore for these bondholders, RaD is the
relevant recovery rate. However a CDS participant may not have a position in
the underlying bonds. Oehmke and Zawadowski (2016) show that speculative
activity is concentrated in CDS markets due to availability of standardized con-
tracts of the same term, unlike in bond markets where a multitude of issues with
different terms, coupons and liquidity make speculation difficult. Thus, these
speculators are unlikely to have positions in underlying bonds and RaD may not
be a relevant measure of recovery for them. UR is a direct measure of the loss
on a credit security and a more relevant benchmark for CDS auction recoveries.
If bond prices in the post- default period are accurate estimates of UR then
the choice between RaD and UR is redundant. Many studies have examined
this question previously. Warner (1977) uses a sub-sample of railroad bonds (20
firms and 73 bonds) to form an equal weighted portfolio of bonds in default.
He then compares its monthly performance to a risk-adjusted portfolio of stocks
in non-bankrupt railroad firms over the same post-petition period. The bond
portfolio generates statistically significant abnormal returns of 1.05 percent a
month compared to its benchmark. Abnormal returns of the bond portfolio are
concentrated in the 1940-1942 time period and do not hold when that time period
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is excluded.
Eberhart and Sweeney (1992) use a sample of 67 firms with 170 bonds to
perform a series of tests examining market efficiency for bonds in default. They
calculate actual returns of bonds in the post-default period to the month of
emergence from bankruptcy. They posit that if the market is efficient, these
returns should not be statistically abnormal when benchmarked against a model
for bond returns. They further hypothesize that for market efficiency to be
proven conclusively, these returns should yield an alpha of zero and beta of one
when regressed on expected returns (derived from a model). They perform tests
using both a model for bond returns and actual market returns as the benchmark.
Tests based on the market model yield conflicting results while those using market
returns support market efficiency. UR is not directly used for these tests and the
bond price in the month of emergence from bankruptcy is considered to be an
accurate estimate of UR.
Altman and Eberhart (1994) extend the study to 91 firms with 232 bonds but
test for efficiency within each priority (seniority) category. They use bond price
at default and UR on emergence to calculate returns on these bonds during the
post-default period. They test for abnormality in these returns using the Blume-
Keim low rated bond index as the benchmark. In a sample with several issues
of the same underlying, their tests reject the hypothesis of bond price efficiency
in the post-default period. Some sub-samples support efficiency for some classes
of securities but not for subordinated securities which form the largest chunk of
their sample. Therefore, while bond prices may be efficient in estimating UR for
some sub-samples and for some time periods, this fact can not be generalized.
Using UR for my analysis avoids these concerns about bond price efficiency in
the post-default period.
Several studies have examined the presence of a liquidity component in bond
prices and credit spreads19. If defaulted bond prices also have a significant liq-
19Huang and Huang (2012), Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005), Ericsson and Renault
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uidity component, measures of RaD may not be comparable recoveries in CDS
auctions since CDS markets have standardized contracts that may be more liquid
(Oehmke and Zawadowski (2016)). Moreover, if the liquidity component varies
in magnitude due to issue-specific factors then this bias in RaD measures may
not be uniform across auctions making RaD unsuitable for benchmarking auction
recoveries.
Lastly RaD for LCDS auctions for loans requires high frequency loan pricing
data post default. Due to the unavailability of this data most previous studies
have ignored the sample of LCDS auctions. Using UR allows me to include LCDS
auctions in the sample of this study.
C Theoretical Motivation
The efficacy of CDS auctions has been assessed theoretically by several researchers
prominent among who are Chernov, Gorbenko, and Makarov (2013), Du and Zhu
(2017) and Peivandi (2014).
Chernov, Gorbenko, and Makarov (2013) use the set up of Wilson (1979)
and Back and Zender (1993) to analyze the auction theoretically. In their model
agents are risk-neutral with identical valuations of the deliverable bonds. Agents’
wealth comprises of four components. The first component is the value of their
initial holding of bonds which is the product of the value of those bonds and the
number of bonds that they hold. The second component is their payoff from the
physical settlement in the auction which is the product of the number of CDS
contract physically settled and the difference between the par value and the true
value of the bonds. The third component is their payoff from the cash settlement
in the auction which is product of the number of CDS contracts cash settled
(2006), Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007), Han and Zhou (2008), Mahanti, Nashikkar, Subrah-
manyam, Chacko, and Mallik (2008), Das and Hanouna (2009), Rossi (2014), Chen, Fabozzi,
and Sverdlove (2010), Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011), Feldhu¨tter (2012), Helwege, Huang, and
Wang (2014), Dick-Nielsen, Feldhu¨tter, and Lando (2012), Friewald, Jankowitsch, and Subrah-
manyam (2013).
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(difference between the number of CDS contracts they hold and the number of
CDS contracts that are physically settled) and the difference between the par
value and the auction price. The last component is the product of the number of
bonds allocated to the agent in the second stage of the auction and the difference
between the value of those bonds and the auction price.
Thus the auction price affects only the third and fourth components of an
agent’s utility, that is the payoff from the allocation of bonds in the second
stage of the auction and the part of the CDS position that is cash settled. No
constraints are imposed on the aggregate quantity of bonds that the agents are
endowed with, the number of contracts that are settled physically (requiring
delivery of bonds) and the aggregate amount of bonds that are allocated to the
agents through the second stage of the auction.
Short sale constraints (agents can only sell the amount of bonds they are
endowed with) and holding constraints (some agents cannot hold bonds after the
auction) are introduced in the model as trading frictions.
To solve the model without trading frictions, Chernov, Gorbenko, and Makarov
(2013) first solve for the equilibrium outcome in the second stage of the auction
for a given NOI and then solve for the optimal PSRs (physical settlement re-
quests) submitted by the agents for the given equilibrium outcome in the second
stage.
They show that in the absence of trading frictions a positive NOI can never be
more than the net CDS positions of protection sellers and vice versa. Intuitively
this can be understood through the following example. A positive NOI (or SELL
NOI) is the difference between the SELL PSRs submitted by the protection buyers
and the BUY PSRs submitted by protection sellers. Net CDS positions are
defined as the difference between the total outstanding CDS contracts of an agent
and the number of CDS contracts that are physically settled by the agent. In
order to settle a contract physically, it is necessary to submit a PSR but a PSR
does not always lead to a physical settlement. Only matched PSRs from the
80
protection buyers and sellers are settled physically. Even if protection sellers
were to settle zero contracts physically (by submitting zero PSR) and protection
buyers were to try and settle all their contracts physically by submitting PSRs
for their entire position, the NOI will be positive (SELL), at its maximum value
and equal to the CDS positions of the protection buyers which is equal to the
net CDS positions of the protection sellers (because they submitted zero PSRs).
If any of the protection sellers were to submit a BUY PSR and/or any of the
protection buyers submit a SELL PSR less than their entire CDS position, the
NOI will be positive but less than the net CDS position of the protection sellers.
With a positive NOI which is less than the net CDS positions of the protection
sellers (positions that will be cash settled based on the auction price), protection
sellers have an incentive to bid up the price of the bonds above fair value in
the second stage of the auction since the loss on purchasing the NOI amount of
bonds will be more than offset by the gain from paying less on the cash settled
contracts (which are larger in amount than the NOI). Thus a positive NOI (SELL)
can lead to the auction price being higher than true value. Similarly a negative
NOI (BUY) can lead the auction price to be lower than true value.
Chernov, Gorbenko, and Makarov (2013) show that in their model without
trading frictions, irrespective of under or overpricing equilibrium, all agents can
gain the same utility as they would if the auction price was equal to true value.
This is because protection buyers and sellers can submit PSRs in the first stage
of the auction so as to negate the impact of over or underpricing in the second
stage of the auction. In the example considered previously, overpricing was an
equilibrium outcome in the second stage of the auction (with a SELL NOI) as
protection sellers bid up the price of the bonds above fair value to generate net
gains from cash settlement at the cost of protection buyers cash settling their
contracts. However protection buyers can ex ante negate the loss from the cash
settled positions by submitting PSRs equal to their CDS positions in the first
stage of the auction. This way the loss incurred by them on the cash settled
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contracts due to overpricing of bonds will be offset exactly by the gain from
selling those bonds through the PSR and NOI. This holds symmetrically for
situations where the NOI is BUY. Thus in a pure equilibrium there is no loss of
utility to any of the agents.
These results are contingent on the assumption that there are no constraints
on the supply of the bonds that can be used by the protection buyers for physical
settlement. Given the issues with the settlement of CDS contracts of Delphi
under old physical settlement regime, this assumption is open to question.
Chernov, Gorbenko, and Makarov (2013) introduce trading frictions in the
form of short selling constraints. The model is solved under the assumption that
each agent can only sell the amount of bonds that she is endowed with and that
there exists at least one protection buyer whose CDS position is larger than her
bond endowment. This constrains her from submitting SELL PSRs for her entire
CDS position in the first stage of the auction. Under these conditions a sub game
perfect overpricing equilibrium can be constructed where the auction price is 100
and protection sellers have utility far greater than what it would be if the auction
price was equal to true value. Such equilibrium is possible because with at least
one protection buyer unable to submit PSRs covering her entire CDS position,
the NOI is smaller than the net CDS position of the protection sellers and they
can bid up the prices for the NOI bonds with larger offsetting gains from their
larger net CDS positions which are cash settled at a higher price.
If the second trading friction is imposed instead, the model predictions change
significantly. The second friction assumes that there exists at least one protec-
tion seller who cannot hold a positive amount of bonds after the auction. This
friction is intended to capture the presence of pension funds and/or insurance
companies who cannot hold bonds of firms in default. Under this assumption
an equilibrium can be constructed where the final auction price is a decreasing
function of the NOI. If the protection buyers have very large CDS positions, they
have an incentive to submit large SELL PSRs so as to generate a positive NOI
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(SELL) at the end of the first stage of the auction. Since the final auction price
is a decreasing function of the NOI, a large SELL NOI will lead to a price lower
than true value. The loss incurred by the protection buyers by selling bonds at
less than true value in the second stage of the auction will be more than offset
by the gains from their larger cash settled positions (at less than true value of
recovery). Since protection seller(s) are constrained from holding bonds after the
auction they will be unable to correct the underpricing by purchasing bonds in
the second stage.
Thus under Chernov, Gorbenko, and Makarov (2013) when protection buyers
are constrained from submitting PSRs for their entire CDS position, protection
sellers can bid up prices in the second stage of the auction to generate gains
in their cash settled positions thereby leading to overpricing. Conversely, when
protection sellers are constrained from holding bonds after the second stage of the
auction, protection buyers can submit higher PSRs to create a large NOI which
can lead to underpricing of their bonds but generates greater than offsetting gains
on their cash settled CDS positions.
The empirical implications of Chernov, Gorbenko, and Makarov (2013) are
that both under and overpricing are possible with a SELL NOI and vice versa.
For underpricing to be correlated with a SELL NOI, there must be an inverse
relationship between the size of the NOI (SELL) and the final auction price.
These implications are the primary motivation for my study.
Du and Zhu (2017) examine the efficiency of the CDS auctions in the context
of the participation constraints imposed by the current format. Under the current
rules, only protection buyers can submit SELL PSRs (to the extent of their CDS
position) and only protection sellers can submit BUY PSRs. In the second stage,
only bids are allowed if the NOI is SELL and vice versa.
Du and Zhu (2017) construct a two period model where the initial CDS and
bond positions are endogenously determined by a quadratic cost function. In
the next time period, the bond defaults with a given probability. Upon default,
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either a high state or a low state is realized with equal ex ante probability. In
the high state more than fifty percent of the agents have a high value for holding
the bonds while the remaining have a low value for holding them and vice versa
in the low state. These values are independent of the value that accrues to each
agent from her CDS position. This feature of the model is intended to capture
the differential value placed on the same bond by various agents depending on
their ability to manage and profit from the restructuring or bankruptcy process
of the defaulted bond.
Thus the utility of an agent comprises of the time zero benefit of the CDS
position, the time zero cost of the CDS position, the time zero CDS inventory
cost, the time one payout from CDS settlement, the time one profit from the
bonds traded in the CDS auction and the time one inventory cost of the bond
position traded in the CDS auction. As in Chernov, Gorbenko, and Makarov
(2013), no constraints between the supply of bonds and the number of bonds
traded in the auction are modeled. The trading of bonds after default but before
the auction is not modeled as the authors consider such trading to be more costly
than trading the bonds in the auction.
Du and Zhu (2017) then establish a competitive benchmark for the CDS
auction through a double auction where each agent is allowed to submit an un-
constrained demand schedule, unlike in CDS auctions. They then analyze the
efficiency of the outcomes of the two stage CDS auction with respect to the out-
comes of the above benchmark. In the model, a trader with a high value for the
bonds may not have an underlying CDS position or may be a protection buyer.
This constrains her from participating in the first stage of the auction with a
BUY PSR despite having a high value for the bonds. Some low value traders
are similarly constrained in the first stage of the auction. In the second stage of
the auction, participation constraints are imposed by the direction of the NOI. If
the NOI is SELL, low value traders are unable to participate as they have a low
value for the bonds and would like to sell but only buy orders are allowed. Sim-
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ilarly if the NOI is BUY, high value traders are constrained from participating
in the second stage of the auction as they want to buy but only SELL orders are
allowed.
Thus in the high state, while the NOI is BUY, only sell orders are allowed
which means that low value traders dominate the second stage of the auction (as
high value traders are unable to participate) leading to a price which is lower
than the competitive benchmark (double auction) where the demand schedules
for both low and high value traders are unconstrained. Similarly, the low state
leads to a SELL NOI where only buy orders are allowed and high value traders
dominate, leading to a price which is higher than the one established by the
competitive benchmark.
Empirical examination of the model requires detailed information on bond
positions, CDS positions and quotes submitted by each of the participating deal-
ers, pre and post auction. Some predictions of the model can be tested under
certain assumptions. The model predicts underrecovery for SELL NOI auctions
and vice versa in comparison to theoretical outcomes of a double auctions which
the authors consider to be efficient. Assuming that the efficient outcomes of the
double auction are likely to be same as the true recovery values, allows for the un-
derpricing/overpricing predictions to be tested in my sample. These predictions
are opposite to those of Chernov, Gorbenko, and Makarov (2013).
Lastly, Peivandi (2014), examines CDS auctions as a mechanism design prob-
lem. He models the participation choices of agents and shows that no auction
format is robust to bilateral or parallel settlement among some agents leading to
incomplete participation in the CDS auction and biased prices. Only a posted
price mechanism where the CDS contracts are settled at a price equal to the
expected value of the bond, conditional on the information available to the mech-
anism designer is robust to participation choices of the agents and produces and
unbiased price. Given the lack of detailed data on participation of agents in the
CDS auction, I do not evaluate Peivandi (2014)’s predictions empirically.
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D Estimating Certainty Equivalents
The estimation of certainty equivalents requires information on the distribution
of ultimate recoveries and its key moments. In the absence of much informa-
tion about the distribution of ultimate recoveries, I use an approach based on
the conditional distribution of ultimate recovery. Given limitations of data, my
approach differs for the loan and bond samples.
For all the bonds in my sample I first estimate daily volume weighted prices
as outlined by Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2008) from the cleaned
Enhanced TRACE database. Then, I average these prices over the interval of
time between declaration of bankruptcy or credit event and the CDS auction. Is-
sues with the liquidity of the bonds in default manifest themselves in this exercise
and I lose 2 observations out of 44 on account of no trade in those bonds after
default. Using a different interval which more closely straddles the auction dates
leads to the loss of even more observations and therefore I perform the analysis
with bond prices averaged over the entire time interval between the credit event
and the auction. I assume that this price imputes most of the information rele-
vant for the estimation of the ultimate recovery rates ex ante. I then regress the
ultimate recoveries on these bond prices and use the coefficients of the bond price
(which are significant) to estimate the mean of the distribution of ultimate recov-
eries for each firm. I assume that ultimate recoveries of all firms have the same
Gaussian distribution and identical variance which is estimated as the variance
of the residual in sample. These assumptions yield the Gaussian distributions of
ultimate recovery for each credit event. The mean of each of these distributions
is different but the variance is same.
I then draw ten thousand observations from these distributions and estimate
the utilities associated with each of them using a CRRA utility function with a
coefficient of risk aversion of 2. I ascertain the mean utility and back out the
certainty equivalent. I repeat this exercise ten thousand times and take the mean
of the ten thousand certainty equivalent estimates as my measure of the certainty
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equivalent. I discount them at the risk free rate obtained from OIS Swaps for
the time period between auction date and date of ultimate recovery. I do this
for each firm in the sample Lastly, I regress the certainty equivalent estimates on
auction-prices and an indicator for Sell-NOI.
Results in column A of Table 11 show that coefficient for the NOI indicator
is not significant thereby implying that the conditional on pre-auction informa-
tion embedded in bond prices the certainty equivalent estimates do not differ
significantly from the auction outcome on account of the NOI.
However given the small size of the sample, individual but extreme observa-
tions can have a large effect on the significance of estimates. In order to verify the
robustness of these inconclusive results, I apply the same econometric specifica-
tions on a winsorized version of the sample. Specifically I remove one observation
each of certainty equivalents which are farthest from the auction price on both
positive and negative sides, that is, I remove the observation which represents
greatest underrecovery and also the observation which represents the greatest
overrecovery.
As can be seen in column B of Table 11 the results from the winsorised sample
show that certainty equivalents are significantly higher than the auction outcomes
for Sell-NOI auctions. These results are in line with the main findings of the study
and conform to theoretical predictions about the auction process.
Due to the unavailability of loan prices I use an alternative but less robust
approach. Khieu, Mullineaux, and Yi (2012) show that ultimate recoveries for
loans depend on firm specific, industry and economic factors. Their results imply
that the most significant determinants of loan recovery rates are the nature of
collateral, firm indebtedness at the time of bankruptcy, industry performance
prior to bankruptcy, prior year GDP and time to emerge from bankruptcy. I
use the coefficients from their analysis to estimate the mean of the recovery
distributions for each of the firms in my sample. I then compare these estimates
to the actual recoveries in my sample and compute the sum of squared errors
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which allows me to estimate the variance of the residuals. Similar to the analysis
of bonds I assume that these distributions are Gaussian. I then apply the same
methodology as I did for bonds to estimate the certainty equivalents for loans
in my sample. This approach is much weaker compared to the one adopted for
bonds.
Column C of Table 11 outlines the regression results for the loan sample. The
certainty equivalents are not higher than the auction price for auctions where the
NOI is “Sell”.
Given the limitations of data and restrictive assumptions involved the es-
timation of certainty equivalents, these results are inconclusive in establishing
efficiency of CDS auctions and at best marginally support Chernov, Gorbenko,
and Makarov (2013) predictions of underrecovery.
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Table 18: OLS Regressions for certainty equivalents of ultimate recoveries
OLS regressions of certainty equivalents of
bond and loan ultimate recoveries on the auction price and a binary variable
which takes the value of one if the auction has a SELL-NOI and 0 otherwise.
Column A includes the full sample of bonds auctions, column B includes a
winsorised sample of bonds auctions and column C pertains to the sub
sample of loan auctions. T Statistics are in parentheses.
A B C
Intercept
.08747
(2.48)**
.0089
(0.41)
(.0927)
(5.49)***
SELLDUMMY
(.0256)
(.79)
.04387
(2.25)**
.0032
(.28)
Auction Price
.6222
(9.65)***
.6722
(17.14)***
.0442
(2.23)**
Adjusted R Squared 0.71 0.89 0.12
Observations 42 40 24
*, ** and *** represent significance at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence respectively.
Note:Certainty equivalents for CDS auctions are estimated by regressing ultimate recoveries on
average pre-auction bond prices and using the coefficients to calculate the mean of of the conditional
distribution of ultimate recoveries for each auction. distribution is assumed to be Gaussian with equal
variance for all auctions. The variance is estimated as the variance of the residual. CRRA utility
function with a coefficient of risk aversion of 2 is used to calculate the utility of ten thousand draws
of ultimate recovery and the certainty equivalent is backed out. This exercise repeated ten thousand
times for each auction to get an average certainty equivalent. For LCDS auctions, coefficients of
determinants of loan ultimate recovery are not estimated but taken from Khieu, Mullineaux, and Yi
(2012).
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